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THE GULF OF SIDRA
"[Ojur objective in this operation was. . . to maintain basic prin-
ciples of freedom of navigation in international waters and air-
space. We sought only to conduct a freedom-of-navigation exercise
in waters universally recognized as international seas, more than
100 miles off the coast of a country whose government has made
excessive claims to those waters and had militarily threatened any
nation to defy them."'
INTRODUCTION
The Gulf of Sidra is a large indentation into the coast of Libya,
approximately 275 miles wide by 150 miles deep.' Since 1973, Libya
unilaterally has claimed the Gulf as part of its integral territory and
as being under its complete sovereignty.3 The United States denies
this claim; it considers the Gulf international waters and asserts the
right of all states to navigate freely within the Gulf.4 In an effort to
assert rights of navigation, the United States has continued to con-
duct military maneuvers within the Gulf 5 The dispute sharpened
when in March, 1986, Libyan forces fired missiles at United States
Naval aircraft operating over the Gulf. In response, United States
forces destroyed the sources of the Libyan attack.' The conflict has
1. Statement of Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, explaining the role of
United States maneuvers within the Gulf. L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, §5, at 5, col. 1
[hereinafter statement of Weinberger].
2. COLUMBIA LIPPINCOTT GAZETTER OF THE WORLD 1763 (2d rev. ed. 1962).
3. Declaration of Oct. 10, 1973, reprinted in Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays:
An Analysis of Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 65, 67-68
(1983).
4. See statement of Weinberger, supra note 1.
5. The maneuvers have not been without incident. In August 1981, two United
States Navy F-14 fighter jets shot down two Libyan SU-22 fighters 60 miles off the
Libyan coast, after being fired upon by one of the Libyan airciaft. In January 1986,
while the United States 6th Fleet was conducting planned maneuvers near the Gulf,
Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi boarded an armed Libyan patrol boat and
sailed into the Gulf to stage a confrontation. However, the Libyans took no military
action. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at All, col. 1-4. Other military maneuvers since
have been held in an effort to underscore freedom of navigation. San Diego Union, July
15, 1986, at II, col. I.
6. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
caused international concern over the continued peaceful stability of
the region.
7
This conflict raises important issues concerning unilateral claims
to large expanses of ocean space, as well as the resort to force in
settling these claims. Two important sources of international law are
useful in resolving these issues. First, the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) 8 prescribes defini-
tive rules with respect to claiming expanses of ocean as sovereign
territory. Second, the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter or the
Charter)9 defines the permissible use of force under international
law. This Comment will evaluate the validity of the Libyan claim to
the Gulf of Sidra in relation to the LOS Convention. An analysis
then will be made to determine the lawfulness of United States Na-
val maneuvers within the Gulf. Finally, an analysis will be made of
the resort to the use of force in the settlement of this dispute within
the context of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.
THE INCIDENT
On March 25, 1986, the United States Sixth Fleet, consisting of a
30-ship task force, was conducting air and sea maneuvers in the
Mediterranean Sea, 10 well north of the disputed Gulf of Sidra.11 The
purpose of the maneuvers was to assert the right of free navigation
within the Gulf of Sidra. 2 Three aircraft carriers led the task force
- the Coral Sea, the Saratoga, and the America a - from which
regular flight operations took place. 4 The United States filed a no-
7. The United States won qualified support from most of its allies. The greatest
concern was over the potential for escalation of the hostilities. The Soviet Union accused
the United States of trying to provoke a military showdown. See generally L.A. Times,
Mar. 26, 1986, § 1, at 12, col. 1-6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 4; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1986, at 8, col. I.
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOS Conven-
tion]. The LOS Convention will be discussed wherever applicable, notwithstanding that
the United States is not a party thereto, because the LOS Convention virtually restates
the provisions concerning delimitation of bays of its predecessor, the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, of which the United States is a party. The
relevant articles concerning delimitation are considered definitive. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 194 (6th ed. 1963); see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. Further-
more, Libya is a signatory to the LOS Convention. 21 I.L.M. 1477. For the United
States' posture toward the LOS Convention, see Richardson, The United States Posture
Toward the Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward but not Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 505 (1983).
9. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter U.N.
CHARTER].
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
11. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 1.
12. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at AI0, col. 4.
13. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 1.
14. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, at A8, col. 6 (city ed.).
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tice of intent with the International Civil Aviation Organization to
ensure the safety of airliners in the region.1i
United States Naval aircraft, including F-14's, F-18's and A-7's,
entered the Gulf below 32 degrees 30 minutes latitude 16 - the
boundary line south of which Libya claims its territorial waters.' 7 A
United States Navy surface action group then entered the Gulf at a
point within 40 miles of the Libyan coast."8 Three ships made up the
surface action group - the Aegis air-defense cruiser Yorktown, a
destroyer, and a guided-missile cruiser.19
Hostilities began soon afterward when Libya fired surface-to-air
missiles at United States aircraft. 20 Four Soviet-made SAM-5 and
two SAM-2 missiles were fired from a missile-launching site at Surt
on the Libyan coast.2' However, United States radar jamming tech-
nology emitted from EA-6B support aircraft caused the missles to
miss their intended targets.22 The rules of engagement, as approved
by President Reagan, gave the Sixth Fleet Commander discretion to
respond to the Libyan attack.2 3 The Commander determined that
Libya had committed "hostile" acts and ordered a response to any
further aggression by Libyan forces.24
A Libyan high speed missile-carrying patrol boat was detected ap-
proaching United States warships. 25 In response, United States air-
craft fired two Harpoon missiles at the Libyan patrol boat, destroy-
ing it.26 Two United States. A-7's, from the aircraft carrier Saratoga,
then attacked the missile site at Surt, the source of the earlier Lib-
yan missile attacks. 27 HARM anti-radiation missiles struck the mis-
sile site, rendering it inoperable. 28 A second Libyan Combattante
class patrol boat was detected as it approached within offensive-mis-
15. Id.
16. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 2.
17. Colonel Qaddafi has called this boundary line the "line of death," challenging
United States forces to cross it. See supra notes 3 and 5 and accompanying text.
18. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at A10, col. 6.
19. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 2-3.
20. Id.
21. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 4. The missiles use radar to find
their targets and travel at three times the speed of sound. Id.
22. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 4.
23. The maneuvers were approved by President Reagan with the expectation of a
Libyan attack. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 5-6.
24. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 1.
25. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at AI0, col. 6.
26. Id.
27. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 2.
28. Id.
sile range of United States forces.29 The Libyan patrol boat was em-
ploying radar and was accelerating toward the United States aircraft
carriers. 30 The Aegis cruiser Yorktown fired two surface-to-surface
missiles, sinking the approaching patrol boat.31 When the missile-
launching site at Surt again became operational, 32 it was attacked a
second time and put out of action. 33 The following day, a third Lib-
yan patrol boat, a Nanuchka-class corvette, was attacked after it left
the port of Benghazi and began heading toward United States
forces.3 4 The corvette was destroyed. 35 Hostilities ended with United
States forces proceeding unchallenged within the Gulf.36 Twenty-
four Libyan sailors were believed killed in the attacks on Libyan pa-
trol boats.37 The United States suffered no casualties.3 8
LIBYA'S CLAIM
In 1973, Libya made a unilateral claim to the Gulf of Sidra in a
letter to the United Nations. The claim purported to enclose all wa-
ters landward of 32 degrees 30 minutes as an integral part of Libyan
territory, and therefore under its complete sovereignty.39 The validity
of Libya's claim delimiting the Gulf of Sidra as internal waters de-
pends upon the recognition of the claim in relation to recognized
principles of the international law of the sea.4 0 One of the most im-
portant sources concerning international law of the sea is the LOS
Convention.4 1 Except for minor changes, 42 it virtually restated the
relevant provisions concerning the delimitation of bays of its prede-
cessor, the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone.43 The provisions concerning delimitation of bays are consid-
29. The missile range of this patrol boat is approximately 38 miles. Id. at col. 1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at col. 3.
32. The radar dish at the missile launching site is relatively easy to replace. L.A.
Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 34, col. 4.
33. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
37. L.A. Times, Mar. 28, 1986, § 1, at 9, col. 4.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 3.
40. Comment, International Law and the Delimitation of Bays, 49 N.C.L. REv.
944, 953 (1971).
41. See LOS Convention, supra note 8.
42. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 2 (changes "this Convention" to
"these articles") and para. 5 ("nautical miles" to "miles.") For the differences between
the LOS Convention and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
concerning the system of straight baselines, see Guttry, The Delimitation of Territorial
Waters in the Mediterranean Sea, I I SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 377, 378 n.8 (1984).
43. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.T.S. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964).
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ered generally recognized international law.44 Thus, the LOS Con-
vention may be used as a guide in determining the validity of Libya's
claim.
The LOS Convention allows a state to claim a marginal belt of
water along its coast as its territorial sea.45 The territorial sea is
measured from a baseline4' at the low-water mark following the sin-
uosities of the coast and extending seaward a certain distance.
However, in the case of bays, gulfs, and other coastal peculiarities,
exceptions exist to the normal baseline rule. These exceptions are the
juridical bay, the historic bay and the straight baseline method,48
discussed more thoroughly below.
Generally, a bay is delimited by drawing an imaginary line - a
baseline - across the mouth of the bay, assuming certain legal re-
quirements are met.49 The waters enclosed by the baseline form part
of the state's internal waters; 50 those waters on the seaward side of
the baseline are territorial waters. The drawing of such a baseline is
what has sparked the current conflict between the United States and
Libya.
44. See Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments,
34 Am. U.L. REV. 271, 276-79 (1984); Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention
and Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 491, 510 (1984).
45. Territorial waters are those waters over which a state enjoys exclusive sover-
eignty. Traditionally, territorial waters were limited to the extent a state could exercise
control. This became known as the "cannonshot" rule. See generally C. COLOMBos, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 87-175 (6th ed. 1967). Modernly, states have sought
to extend their territorial waters beyond traditionally recognized distances. This has been
termed "creeping jurisdiction" by one author. See K. BOOTH. LAW, FORCE & DIPLO-
MACY AT SEA 37-58 (1985). Article 3 of the LOS Convention allows a state to establish
the breadth of its territorial seas not exceeding 12 nautical miles. LOS Convention,
supra note 8, art. 3. Libya has claimed a 12 mile limit. Foreign states traditionally have
been allowed to pass through the territorial waters of another state as long as the passage
is innocent. For an in-depth discussion of this right in reference to the innocent passage
of warships, see Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-Innocent Passage of Warships in the
Territorial Sea, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625 (1984).
46. The baseline is an imaginary line from which the territorial sea is be mea-
sured. M. STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 5 (1963).
47. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 45, at 88.
48. See generally M. STROHL, supra note 46.
49. Id. at 3-6.
50. Id. at 6. Internal waters are considered within the exclusive sovereignty of the
coastal state. They differ from territorial waters in one important aspect - there is no
right of passage by foreign states. L. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4-6 (1964).
Juridical Bay
The first exception to the normal baseline rule is the juridical bay.
Article 10 of the LOS Convention sets forth two tests for the deter-
mination of a bay. 51 Satisfaction of both tests results in a juridical
bay. The first test, labeled as the semi-circle test, is used to distin-
guish a bay from a mere curvature of the coast. 52 Under this test, a
straight closing line is drawn between the entrance points of the in-
dentation. The indentation is to be regarded as a bay if the area is as
large as, or larger than, that of a semi-circle whose diameter is the
closing line.53 The sea area of the Gulf of Sidra is much smaller than
that of such a semi-circle, and thus does not satisfy the requirement
of article 10(2) of the LOS Convention.54
The second test for the determination of a bay is set forth in arti-
cle 10(5). This test limits the mouth of a bay to a distance twice the
maximum allowable territorial sea width, or twenty-four miles.as The
distance at 32 degrees 30 minutes latitude is approximately 275 nau-
tical miles, 56 far exceeding the twenty-four mile limit of article
10(5). Therefore, the Gulf of Sidra meets neither of the technical
requirements of a juridical bay of article 10 of the LOS Convention.
Historic Bays
The second exception to the normal baseline rule is that of the
historic bay.57 Although agreement exists as to the general require-
ments of a valid claim under the doctrine of historic bays, disagree-
ment exists as to the application of these requirements.5" This lack of
agreement has resulted in the absence of a codified rule in the LOS
Convention.59
Three general requirements exist for the recognition of a claim
51. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 4, paras. 2 & 5.
52. See M. STROHL, supra note 46, at 55-57; Comment, supra note 40, at 947.
53. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 2.
54. Francioni, The Status of the Gulf of Sirte in International Law, 11 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 311, 315 (1984) [hereinafter Francioni Status]. See generally,
Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte Incident (United States v. Libya) and International Law V,
ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 100 (evaluation of the 1981 incident).
55. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 5.
56. See supra note 2.
57. Related to the doctrine of historic bays is the questionable doctrine of "vital"
bays. For an in-depth discussion concerning the applicability of both, see Spinnato, supra
note 3, at 72-82; Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 320-26. Comment, The Doctrine of
Historic Bays: Applying an Anachronism in the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1986).
58. See L. BOUCHEZ, supra note 50, at 199-202; M. STROHL, supra note 46, at
251-305.
59. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 6 (creating exception for his-
toric bays). It has been suggested that an explanation for the failure to codify the doc-
trine of historic bays is a desire to keep it purposely vague. See Comment, supra note 40,
at 959.
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under the doctrine of historic bays. First, the coastal state must
claim the body of water as within its sovereignty. Second, the state
must exercise sovereignty over the waters for a sufficiently long pe-
riod of time. Finally, other states must acquiesce to the exercise of
such sovereignty.60 As applied to Libya's claim to the Gulf, the short
duration of the claim tends to make the doctrine inapplicable. De-
spite Libya's assertion that it has exercised sovereignty over the Gulf
throughout history and without dispute, there is no serious evidence
to confirm this.61 Libya became a state in 1951 and at no time prior
to 1973 did Libya attempt to exercise sovereignty over the Gulf.62
Sovereignty was not exercised over the Gulf earlier during the Ital-
ian domination, or before, under the Turkish domination of Libya. 3
The lack of acquiescence by other states also is problematic. Im-
mediately following Libya's 1973 proclamation of sovereignty over
the Gulf, the United States filed protest.6 4 Other states similarly
have protested the Libyan claim. 5 In order to challenge the claim
and show nonacquiescence, the United States continually has entered
the Gulf.66 This nonacquiescence, together with the short duration of
the claim, tends to defeat the application of the doctrine of historic
bays to Libya's claim to the Gulf.
Straight Baselines
A final exception to the normal baseline method of delimitation of
territorial waters is the straight baseline method. The concept of
straight baselines was derived from the Fisheries Case, decided in
1951 by the International Court of Justice.67 The 1958 Convention
60. See L. BOUCHEZ, supra note 50, at 203.
61. See Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 322; Spinnato, supra note 3, at 76-
77.
62. Spinnato, supra note 3, at 74; see Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 322.
63. Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 322.
64. Spinnato, supra note 3, at 77.
65. Id.
66. See statement of Weinberger, supra note 1, at col. 2.
67. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18). In the
Fisheries Case, Norway sought to protect the historic fisheries off its coast. The coastline
has two unique characteristics. The Northern Arctic section is made up of great indenta-
tions which form the entrances to fjords. The Atlantic section is paralleled by an archi-
pelago. Norway claimed as its territorial waters a width extending from a straight base-
line drawn along the direction of coast connected by natural landmarks. Many of the
inhabitants of coastal Norway were economically dependent on the fisheries landward of
the baselines. Great Britain disputed this claim and sought to fish within the waters,
consistent with the right of fishing associated with the principle of freedom of the high
seas. The Court found for Norway and established the principles from which straight
baselines emerged.
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone codified this method and
it was readopted in its successor, the LOS Convention. 8 The ambig-
uous language in the Fisheries Case decision, however, has led to
many interpretation problems.69 The ambiguities have resulted in an
increase in claims based on an arguably liberal application of the
doctrine.7 0 Although the 1973 Libyan proclamation does not claim
the use of the straight baseline method, an evaluation is appropriate
in light of the Fisheries Case.
Article 7 of the LOS Convention provides four conditions for the
application7 1 of the straight baseline method.72 First, the coastline
must be deeply indented or cut into.7 3 Second, the drawing of base-
lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general di-
rection of the coast. 4 Third, the sea areas lying within the lines must
be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the
regime of internal waters. 75 Finally, account may be taken of the
locality's peculiar economic interests which are clearly evidenced by
long usage.7 6
The Gulf of Sidra reasonably cannot be characterized as a deep
indentation or cut into the coast.77 Instead, the Gulf is a large curva-
ture in the coast of Libya 275 miles long and 150 miles deep. As-
suming arguendo that the first condition of article 7 is met, the
drawing of a straight baseline across the mouth of the Gulf would
depart from the general direction of the coast with the effect of
rounding off the African coast.7 1 Peculiar economic interest presents
another obstacle to the application of the straight baseline method.
As applied similarly within the historic bays doctrine, little evidence
exists to support an historical economic dependence on the Gulf.7 9
68. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
69. See Guttry, supra note 42, at 391.
70. See Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 320 n. 53.
71. For a detailed analysis on the application of the straight baseline method, see
Alexander & Hodgson, Towards an Objective Analysis of Special Circumstances, Bays,
Rivers, Coastal and Oceanic Archipelagos and Atolls, in THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTI-
TUTE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 13 (1972).
72. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
73. The straight baseline method also may apply to fringe islands. LOS Conven-
tion, supra note 8, art. 7, para. 1.
74. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 7, para. 3.
75. Id.
76. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 7, para. 5.
77. See Francioni, Status, supra note 54, at 319.
78. Id.
79. Id. Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, as represented in its Declaration ofOctober 10, 1973, is based, among other things, on economic and security concerns. See
Spinnato, supra note 3. Ironically, Libya used economic concern to justify its insistenceon a 12 mile territorial sea during the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Territorial
Sea. In particular, Libya claimed its fisheries were of great importance as a source offood, and together with sponges, consistuted a valuable export. In sharp contrast to theseassertions, two reports prepared through the United Nations Technical Assistance Pro-
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For these reasons, the straight baseline method should not be
applicable.
Under the three exceptions to the normal baseline rule, the Libyan
claim to the Gulf is not supported by recognized principles of inter-
national law of the sea. Because the claim is not recognized, the Gulf
belongs to no one state, but instead to all states. This conclusion
raises the issue as to the legality of the presence of United States
forces within the Gulf, discussed below.
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
Libya claims a twelve mile limit as its territorial seas.
0 Those wa-
ters beyond the twelve mile limit are the high seas,"1 of which most
of the Gulf qualifies. The high seas are not subject to ownership or
sovereignty by any state, but instead belong to the community of all
states."2 The most important aspect of the high seas is the body of
rights associated with it - most notably, freedom of navigation.
8 3
The right of free navigation is part of the universally recognized
gram found practically no inshore fishing in Libya, despite the abundance of fish and the
length of the coastline. Further, the reports found that the per capita consumption of fish
in Tripoli was two kilograms per year, and that practically no fishing infrastructure
(boats, skilled manpower, harbours, equipment) existed. The result was a fictitious Lib-
yan fishing industry. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
550-52 (1962).
80. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81. The high seas are those bodies of water that extend beyond the territorial
waters of the coastal state. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 45, at 47. Under the LOS
Convention, a state may claim up to two hundred miles outward of the territorial seas as
that state's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The establishment of an EEZ does not
interfere with other state's rights with regard to freedoms associated with the high seas.
See LOS Convention, supra note 8, arts. 56-58. For puposes of simplicity, the rights and
duties associated with the EEZ will be discussed as the high seas. Within both the EEZ
and the high seas, states are prohibited from using the seas for other than peaceful pur-
poses. See LOS Convention, supra note 8, arts. 88, 301.
82. Id.
83. "Every state, whether coastal or landlocked, has the right to sail ships flying
its flag on the high seas." LOS Convention, supra note 8, arts. 87, 90. According to
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger:
The significance of the freedom of navigation in international waters may
not be fully understood or appreciated.
Freedom of navigation has been critically important to the world community
since man began traveling the seas. Given that two-thirds of the world's surface
is covered by water, this is not too surprising. Commercial vessels and warships
have trafficked in international waters for centuries on strategic or economic
missions.... More recently, that same right was extended to commercial and
military aircraft flying in international airspace.
Statement of Weinberger, supra note 1, at col. I.
doctrine of freedom of the seas. 84 Under the modern doctrine, no
nation may exercise exclusive dominion over the high seas. All stateswhich observe the rules of international law enjoy the same rights
and liberties, regardless of the naval pre-eminence of one state over
another.8 5
The modern doctrine has not always been accepted, but instead,
emerged from historic conflict caused by the competing doctrine ofclosed seas. 86 Dutchman Hugo Grotius87 largely is credited with
championing the concept of freedom of the seas. In 1604 Grotius
began writing his famous treatise, Mare Liberum, in defense of the
Dutch right to trade with the East Indies, which had been chal-
lenged by the Portuguese. Grotius maintained that no nation could
acquire a monopoly on commerce over open sea areas.8s Grotius de-
fended the principle of free seas on two grounds. First, he main-
tained that that which cannot be possessed, such as the physical na-
ture of the seas, cannot be the property of any one state. Second, he
maintained that that which is by its nature inexhaustible and can be
used inoffensively is common to all people. Accordingly, no nation
should be able to claim exclusive dominion of the high seas, nor ex-
clusive rights to navigation.89
Grotius' Mare Liberum was based primarily on protection of free
trade and communication.90 Modernly, this rationale continues as
the basis of freedom of navigation9' and has been extended to incor-
84. Reppy, The Grotian Doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19FORDHAMi L. REv. 243 (1950). See generally Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation-Its Le-gal History and Its Normative Basis, 6 J. MAR. L. & Com. 259 (1975). Though theprinciple of freedom of the seas is well recognized, its application may be endangered bythe recent trend of littoral states to extend their territorial jurisdiction, or "creeping ju-risdiction." See K. BOOTH, supra note 45, at 39-40; Alexander, The Ocean EnclosureMovement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN DIECO L. REv. 561 (1983); Brown, Freedomof the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in
Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 521 (1983).
85. See Reppy, supra note 84, at 243.86. For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine, see Macrae, Customary In-ternational Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L. J.
182-97 (1983); Reppy, supra note 85, at 243-74.
87. See generally Macrae, supra note 86, at 185; Reppy, supra note 85.
88. See Lapidoth, supra note 84, at 263-65.
89. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 259 (1905).
90. See Lapidoth, supra note 84, at 271.91. Freedom of the seas for the purposes of free trade and communication is a
cornerstone of U.S. Naval policy:
The United States is a maritime nation with only two international frontiersand thousands of miles of coastline bordering two of the world's largest oceans
.... Unlike its potential adversaries, the United States is heavily involved inthe interdependent world economy. Should the sea lines of communication beinterdicted for any length of time, the welfare of U.S. citizens would be radi-cally impaired .... All U.S. international relations, be they economic, politi-cal, or military are influenced by this heavy dependence on free and unimpededpassage on the oceans of the world. The dependence on the seas impacts di-
rectly on all consideration of national strategy.
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porate freedom of overflight for aircraft as well.9 2 Freedom of navi-
gation is incorporated in both the LOS Convention
93 and a predeces-
sor, the Convention on the High Seas,
94 and is considered an
established principle of international law. 95 Therefore, the presence
alone of United States forces in the Gulf did not violate Libyan ter-
ritorial sovereignty and was consistent with the right of all states to
freely navigate the high seas. While the mere presence of United
States forces in the Gulf appears proper, the question remains as to
the lawfulness of conducting naval maneuvers on the high seas.
Naval and Air Maneuvers
The use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, although not codi-
fied,96 is a recognized customary right provided that certain condi-
tions are met.91 The right is limited to ensure safety and that other
states' concurrent rights of free navigation are not interfered with.
98
The lawfulness of a naval maneuver or operation must be evalu-
ated in light of other reasonable competing uses of the high seas.
Factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the op-
eration include the size of the ocean area involved, the density of
traffic, other planned uses for the area, precautions taken to ensure
safety to others, and the length of the operation.
99 The application of
these factors to the 6th Fleet maneuvers leads to a conclusion that
the maneuvers were reasonable. The operations took place in a rela-
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, NWP-I (Washington, DC; Department of the
Navy, January 1977) 1-2, reprinted in Truver, The Law of the Sea and the Military Use
of the Oceans in 2010, 45 LA. L. REV. 1227 (1985).
92. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 87, para. 1(b). For a brief synopsis of
modern international aviation law, see Comment, Korean Airline Flight 007, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 878-81 (1985).
93. LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 87, para. 2(b).
94. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, art. 2(4), 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
95. See Sohn, supra note 44, at 277.
96. Article 87, LOS Convention, provides for rights comprising, inter alia, free-
dom of navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables, construction of artificial is-
lands, conditional fishing, and scientific research. These rights are considered exemplary
of recognized customary rights but are not intended to be exhaustive. The high seas are
limited to peaceful purposes. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 87 & 88.
97. See L. BOUCHEZ, supra note 50, at 10.
98. A carrier task force is said to require 200 square miles when deployed for
action. See K. BOOTH, supra note 45, at 140. Another large use of the high seas is for
nuclear armament testing, which can require up to 200,000 square miles of isolated high
seas. The legality of the testing of these weapons is disputed. L. BOUCHEZ, supra note 50,
at 11.
99. Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective, 109/1/959 U.S. NA-
VAL INST. PROC. 26, 30 (1982).
tively isolated area of the Mediterranean with little shipping activ-
ity.1"' The operation lasted only seventy-five hours,"0' and prior no-
tice was given to the International Civil Aviation Organization to
ensure the safety to others.'0 2 For these reasons, the United Statesforces were lawfully using the high seas. The question remains as to
the lawfulness of the use of force which resulted from the United
States presence in the Gulf.
THE USE OF FORCE
The U.N. Charter generally outlaws the use of armed forces to
settle disputes.1o3 Members of the United Nations have accepted an
obligation to settle all international disputes by peaceful means. 04
Article 2(4) of the Charter contains the language proscribing the use
of force: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purpose of the United Nations." 0 5
Still, the Charter recognizes two exceptions in which the use offorce is justified 0 6 - in self-defense when an armed attack occurs,
and when authorized by the United Nations Security Council.'07
Therefore, any resort to armed force that is not justified under either
exception violates international law. Because no action had been au-thorized under the latter exception, this Comment addresses only the
issues concerning the justified use of force in self-defense. A starting
point in the evaluation of the use of force is the characterization ofthe presence of United States-forces in the Gulf, aside from the law-
100. Id.
101. L.A. Times, Mar. 28, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. I (city ed.).
102. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, at AS, col. 5.
103. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620(1983) [hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States]. The end of the parallel customaryright of war culminated with the establishment of the Nuremberg principles. See gener-ally Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 113-14 (1986).
104. See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 103, at 1620. Interestingly,there is no obligation to settle disputes. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 705 (3d ed. 1979).
105. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 2, para, 4.106. Professors Waldock and Brierly support the limited use of force to secure alegal right as outside of the general prohibition of article 2(4) against the use of force.The argument is supported as outside the qualifying language "against the territorialintegrity" of another state, and based on dictum in the Corfu Channel case decided bythe International Court of Justice in 1949. Thus, the presence of United States forces, ifassumed to be a threat of force, would be justified as securing a legal right - the rightof navigation. See 12 M. WHITEHMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-55 (1971)
(citing Waldock); J. BRIERLY, supra note 8, at 428-30. But see D. BowErr, SELF-DE-FENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (1958); 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 256, 264-68 (1963).
107. See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 103, at 1620.
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ful use of the high seas.
Threat of Force
Article 2(4) of the Charter requires members of the United Na-
tions to refrain from the threat of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the Charter.108 The question of whether the
presence of the United States Sixth Fleet manuevers constituted an
unlawful threat of force depends on two factors. First, what consti-
tutes a threat of force? Second, assuming the presence of United
States forces is a threat of force, is it inconsistent with article 2(4)
and thus unlawful?
A threat of force is an express or implied promise by a govern-
ment of a resort to force, conditional on the nonacceptance of that
government's will.109 The United States considers the Gulf of Sidra
to be high seas.110 In order to enforce this position, the United States
has adopted a policy of challenging unlawful claims to the high seas.
The challenge consists of conducting naval maneuvers within dis-
puted waters. In this case, the maneuvers are protected by the formi-
dable and virtually impregnable defense-umbrella of the nearby
Sixth Fleet.1 " The result is the imposition of United States will -
that the disputed waters are high seas - on Libya with an implied
promise that if force is used in opposition to the maneuvers, the of-
fensive capabilities of the nearby Sixth Fleet will be engaged. Un-
questionably, this type of gunboat diplomacy by the United States is
a threat of force.11 2 The question remains as to its lawfulness with
respect to article 2(4).
Among the enumerated purposes of the Charter is the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, the prevention of threats
to peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression." 3 A threat of
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
109. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 364. "[W]here a State, in order to force
its will on another State, threatens to use force against it." L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 913 (1980).
110. See supra note I and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
112. "The danger is that of the presence of foreign warships becoming a form of
political pressure or threat." D. BowETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 8 (1967). "Pressure on a
resisting State consists in a naval or military demonstration; involving such a display of
force as is calculated to achieve the desired effect." L. COLOMBOS, supra note 45, at 471.
See generally K. BOOTH, supra note 45, at 155; see generally Truver supra note 91.
113. U.N. Charter, supra note 9, art. 1, para, 1. Among its other purposes are the
creation of an international organization for the maintenance of peace, friendly relations
and international cooperation. See L. HENKIN, supra note 109, at 1005.
force by member states contrary to these purposes will be considered
unlawful because it is inconsistent with article 2(4). In determining
the lawfulness of the United States threat of force, account should
be taken of all relevant circumstances. Included within these circum-
stances are the 1981 confrontation in the Gulf that resulted in the
downing of two Libyan fighter jets," 4 the drawing of the "line of
death" by Colonel Quaddafi and its military implications,1 " the an-
ticipated military response of Libya by the United States in planning
the "freedom of navigation" exercise,11 6 and the overall relationship
between the two countries. In light of these circumstances and the
anticipated result - a military confrontation - the threat of force
by the United States would be a threat to peace in the region and to
the security of Libya. Therefore, although the presence of United
States forces conducting naval maneuvers within the Gulf is lawful
in the isolated context of freedom of navigation, 117 the "freedom of
navigation" exercise may be rendered unlawful by the threat of force
its presence conveys, which is contrary to the enumerated principles
contained in the Charter and hence in contravention of article 2(4).
However, even if the United States maneuvers within the Gulf may
be characterized as an unlawful threat of force, the subsequent at-
tack by Libya on United States forces is not necessarily lawful. The
lawfulness of the Libyan use of force is dependent upon its justifica-
tion as self-defense. If Libya's attack is not justified as such, then it
also will be an unlawful use of force in contravention of article 2(4).
Self-defense
Self-defense is a universally recognized principle in customary in-
ternational law.118 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the cus-
tomary right of self-defense: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
... ,"'I The purpose of self-defense is to preserve the status quo
pending a solution to the dispute.1 20 It is a privilege which justifies
otherwise illegal conduct if necessary for the protection of certain
rights. 1 21 A necessary precondition to the resort to force used in self-
defense is a breach of a legal duty owed to the state acting in self-
defense.122 But the customary right of self-defense is not unlimited in
114. See supra note 5.
115. See supra note 17.
116. See supra note 24.
117. See supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
118. See D. BowT, supra note 106, at 11.
119. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 51.
120. See D. BowET-r, supra note 106, at 11.
121. Id. at 269.
122. Id.
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discretion or scope. Force used in self-defense must be both neces-
sary and proportionate. Traditionally, self-defense is justified when
the necessity for action is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no
choice of means or moment for deliberation. 123 The force used is lim-
ited to force in proportion to the danger and must not be excessive or
go beyond that required for the protection of the substantive rights
involved.' 24
The most apparent substantive right, that if breached will justify
force used in self-defense, is the right of territorial integrity. 12 How-
ever, because Libya does not have an internationally recognized
claim to the Gulf of Sidra, it has no substantive right to protect.
Therefore, the deadly use of force against the alleged trespasser re-
mains unlawful as being disproportionate to the threat conveyed.
126
While Libya does not have a right to self-defense against an in-
truder into the disputed Gulf waters, one must consider whether
Libya was justified in using force against the United States' unlaw-
ful threat of force. Traditional customary requirements of propor-
tionality apply in this situation - the necessity for action in self-
defense must be instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means or moment for deliberation. Libya's actions do not meet these
criteria. United States forces had entered the disputed waters eight
prior times, and had given advance notice of their intent to conduct
the maneuvers. 127 The Libyans did not attack instantly, but instead
waited until two hours after the maneuvers had begun.' 28 Thus, the
Libyans had ample time under the circumstances for choice of
means and deliberation, for example, diplomatic protest or a request
123. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 232-33
(1962).
124. See D. BOWETT, supra note 106, at 269.
125. Id. at 29.
126. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 374-75; Comment, supra note 92, at 882;
Froman, supra note 45, at 665-66. However, a use of force against an intruder would be
justified if the intrusion was non-innocent and into a state's territorial waters, subject
only to the traditional requirements of proportionality and necessity. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 92, at 870, 881-82, 885 (civil airline intrusion into Soviet territorial
airspace). Generally, passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 3. Under the LOS
Convention, article 30, a state may require a noninnocent intruder to leave immediately,
subject to customary rules regarding the use of force. LOS Convention, supra note 8, art.
30. See Froman, supra note 45, at 625-26, 664-65 (submarine intrusion into Swedish
territorial waters). Libya claims a 12 mile territorial sea. See supra note 80 and accom-
panying text.
127. See supra notes I and 14.
128. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at A8, col. 2.
for protection to the United Nations Security Council.12 Under
these circumstances, despite the unlawful threat of force by the
United States naval maneuvers, the Libyan attack cannot be charac-
terized as a justified act of self-defense. Because the repeated missile
attacks by Libyan forces against United States aircraft were not jus-
tified as self-defense, the only characterization of the attacks would
be as an unlawful use of force130 in contravention of article 2(4) of
the Charter.
Given the unlawful use of force against the United States, was the
response by United States forces justified as self-defense? Clearly, if
an "armed attack" occurs, a state may act in self-defense within the
literal meaning of article 51, subject to the traditional requirements
of necessity and proportionality.131 When missiles are fired at air-
craft operating lawfully, certainly it is necessary to abate the source
before one should find its target. Similarly, approaching high speed
missile-boats must be stopped at the threshold of their missile range.
These are necessary steps for the protection of life which leave no
choice of means or moment for deliberation. It is axiomatic that mis-
sile fire should be met with missile fire and as such is proportionate.
When the source of the missile fire is remote, as in the case of the
Surt SAM missile site, a state may respond beyond the immediate
area of attack when sufficient reasons exist to expect a continuation
of attacks from the same source.1 32 Thus, the defensive actions
against the Surt missile site would be justified because the site was a
source of the original armed attack, and soon after it was hit it again
became operational. Therefore, the force used by United States
forces in repelling the Libyan attacks was justified under customary
international law and within the exception of article 51 to the U.N.
Charter's prohibition on the use of force.
CONCLUSION
The recent conflict between Libya and the United States is repre-
sentative of the growing threat to freedom of navigation by states to
unilaterally claim large ocean expanses. The Libyan claim to the
Gulf of Sidra is not supported by international law. The use of force
129. See H. KELSEN. THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 974-75 (1964), for a
discussion of the Security Council's responsibility to maintain the peace.
130. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a definition of aggression
to aid in determining when an act of aggression has occurred: "An attack by the armed
forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another state."
Definition of Aggression, art. 3, para D, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31)
at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See generally Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 266-68 (1962); 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at
301, 361.
131. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
132. See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 103, at 1638.
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by Libya in an attempt to settle this dispute is a violation of the
prohibition on the use of force in the United Nations Charter and of
customary international laws.
The conflict between Libya and the United States is not a new
one. Instead, it raises the age-old conflict between the competing
principles of sovereignty and freedom of the seas. The most recent
conflict in the Gulf of Sidra evinces the necessity for adherence to
the principles contained in the Charter, namely, the pacific resolu-
tion of disputes. The alternative is, as the recent conflict has shown,
an unfortunate one and threatens the stability of the region.
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